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Notes
Union Investment in Business:
A Source of Union Conflicts of InterestIn the last two decades there has been an explosive growth
of union capital available for investment. Some of this
money has been channeled into businesses which have collective bargaining agreements with the investing union
or which compete with businesses which have such
agreements with the investing union. The authors of this
Note maintain that this type of investment activity can
give rise to union conflicts of interest. They find that present legislation and internal union controls are ineffective
in coping with the problem and conclude that the time
is ripe for both the union movement and Congress to face
the problem and to establish a workable standardto which
the unions must conform.
INTRODUCTION
According to recent estimates, American labor unions now control more than four billion dollars of investment capital;' this is
more than twice the amount of capital which unions controlled a
mere decade ago.2 This mounting pool of capital has two sources
-membership dues, and employer and employee contributions to
union-controlled health, welfare, and pension funds.' During the
last decade membership dues have been raised as the cost of collective bargaining has increased. Part of the increase has been
necessitated by the need for reserves to meet sporadic but costly
1. Time, Jan. 20, 1961, p. 82; N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1959, § 6 (Magazine), p. 9; 1 CCH PENSION PLAN GumE

6021, 7521 (1959).

2. In 1949, a study by a financial journal estimated that union-controlled
investment capital amounted to two billion dollars. Business Week, Nov.
19, 1949, p. 114.
3. See KnUILAND, PENSION PLANS UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING at

v-vii (1953); Dooley, Antitrust Legislation and Labor Unions, 11 LAB.
L.J. 911,932 (1960).
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outlays for strikes and for extraordinary organizing expenses."
Moreover, dues have been increased to finance the growing political and educational activities considered necessary or helpful to
the labor movement.5 During this same period, the achievement
of fringe benefits such as health, welfare, and pension funds has
been a primary collective bargaining objective of all major American unions.6 A by-product of union success in achieving this goal
has been the accumulation of substantial capital to finance these
negotiated benefits.7 The growth of reserves for strikes, organizational purposes, and fringe benefits has thrust upon the labor
movement a large and unanticipated mass of capital available for
immediate investment."
This increase in union controlled capital has necessitated a parallel growth in the responsibility assumed by union officials. They
are compelled to become financiers as well as organizers, administrators, and negotiators. The union leader of today faces the problem of how best to manage this growing investment fund for the
benefits of the union's members. In the past, the union movement
placed heavy emphasis on conservative, noncontroversial investments such as government bonds.9 Although these investments
presented little, if any, potential for a conflict of interests, they deprived the unions of the higher return which would have resulted
from a more sophisticated and diversified investment policy. The
labor movement has become increasingly aware of this self-imposed disadvantage, and it is now seeking investments which will
produce a return comparable to that enjoyed by prudent and experienced investors.
However, a high rate of return is not the only consideration
which union officers must weigh in developing union investment
policies. As stewards of their unions' funds, the officers must
avoid speculative investments and investments which may create a
conflict between the financial interests of the union and the collective bargaining interests of the employees represented by the
4. For example, in 1955, the United Auto Workers announced that it
was establishing a $25,000,000 strike fund to protect against union needs
during a possible strike. GOLDBERG, AFL-CIO: LABOR UNITED 140 (1956).

5. See
6. See

GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 541-46 (2d rev. ed. 1961).
KIRKLAND, op. cit. supra note 3; AFL-CIO, RESOLUTIONS ON
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND RELATED ISSUES 4 (1956).

7. See note 1 supra.

8. This is not to say that the union movement, as a whole, is affluent. An
analysis by Business Week magazine of union reports to the Bureau of
Labor Management Reports indicates that numerous unions are operating
at a loss. See Business Week, June 4, 1960, pp. 82-83.
9. See U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 29, 1960, p. 89.
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union. Unfortunately, these employees' needs are such that unsound investments and investments which raise potential conflicts
of interests are sometimes required. This occurs when the union
provides financial assistance to a failing employer in order to preserve union members' jobs. Such an investment is normally speculative, and the potential conflict of interest is obvious. However,
the answer to the question of whether the interests of the employees
represented by the union will be properly served by such an investment is not obvious.
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate the conflicts of interest problems which may result from union investments in fields
of commerce or industry in which the union performs a collective
bargaining function. Selected instances of union investments will
be examined and the problems presented by these investments
will be discussed in light of the existing statutes, case law, and internal union controls. However, the focus of this Note will be upon
the activities of the investing union as an organization rather than
upon the activities of individual officials who may misuse their office for personal gain."0
I.

UNION INVESTMENTS IN THE EMPLOYER'S OR
HIS COMPETITOR'S BUSINESS

A union's investment in a commercial endeavor is prompted by

a variety of motives. Generally, there is merely the desire to realize
a reasonable return on surplus capital. Occasionally, however,
union funds have been used to preserve and/or create jobs for
union members either by rescuing a failing business or by helping
to expand a market for a unionized employer." In some cases this

may be the only or most effective service which the union can
render its members. In addition, nominal investments have been
made in corporations with which a union has a collective bargaining agreement for the purpose of obtaining company announcements and financial data.' 2
But regardless of what motivates the initial investment, a union
becomes involved in a potential conflict of interest when its
funds are invested either in a business with which the union has
or seeks a collective bargaining agreement or in an enterprise which
deals or competes with a business with which the union has or
10. These activities of individual union officials have been thoroughly
examined by the McClellan Committee. See Hearings Before the Senate
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management

Field, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
11. See Business Week, June 4, 1960, p. 87.
12. See Time, Jan. 20, 1961, p. 82.
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seeks a collective bargaining agreement. Such an involvement by
the union may occur in several ways: by union control of a commercial enterprise; by union ownership of a financial, but noncontrolling, interest in a commercial enterprise through loans from
union treasuries and union managed funds; or by union ownership of a noncontrolling interest in a commercial enterprise
through purchases of stocks, bonds, or other securities.
A.

UNION OWNERSHIP OF A CONTROLLING INTEREST

1.

Union Ownership of the Employer-Company

In its most unsophisticated and least common form, union involvement in management arises when the union acquires ownership of a firm whose employees are also represented by the purchasing union. This situation is typified by the experience of the
United Hat, Cap & Millinery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, in
Amesbury, Massachusetts.''
The Merrimac Hat Company, which employed members of a local affiliate of the Hatter's union, had been losing money because
it was unable to meet the competition of hat manufacturers located in the South. When the company was compelled to close,
the International Hatter's Union joined with local business interests
and reorganized the company. The international union became the
largest stockholder in the reorganized company, and today the international union's officers are members of the Merrimac Hat Company's board of directors. The local Hatter's union has a collective
bargaining agreement with the company. According to The Hat
Worker, the international union's official newspaper, the company
is paying wages at the same level as the industry as a whole, the
relationships between the bargaining representative (local union)
and management (dominated by the international union) are excellent, and the firm is prosperous again.:"
Another situation in which the same potential conflict exists
came to light in the McClellan committee hearings.15 The hearings revealed that the West Coast Conference of Teamsters had
assumed control of a failing Canadian trucking company to which
the union previously had made loans secured by the company's
stock. The union replaced the old management and operated the
company at a loss for several years'to protect the jobs of its
13. See The Hat Worker, Feb. 15, 1961, p. 9.
14. Ibid.
15. Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field (85th Cong.).

NOTES
members and to maintain a Teamster union "toe-hold" in the

Canadian trucking industry. 6

The nature of the conflict of interests problem created in both
of these situations is expressed by a quip which Alex Rose, President of the International Hatter's Union, made concerning the Hatter's experience at Merrimac: "The difficulty is that the workers
don't understand our problems."' Of course this remark was made
in jest, but the time may come when such a remark will be made in
earnest by a union leader. Management and employee needs may
coincide during the "honeymoon" period immediately following
the union's assumption of the managerial function, but it is unrealistic to assume that the needs of both management and employee can be continually served without some compromise of the
union's duty
to seek the best possible working conditions for the
18

employee.

16. See Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4,
at 1307 (1957).
17. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1959, § 6 (Magazine), p. 70.
18. An example of a reported debate that touches the subject is in the
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN
NEWSPAPER GUILD (1950) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. The debate
concerned a committee report urging investment of union funds to establish one or more daily newspapers in the United States in an effort to
create new competition in the newspaper field. The report was in response to the mergers and suspensions in the industry which had enlarged
the number of "one newspaper towns." The threat of monopoly control of
publishing in a single city was conceded by both the minority and
majority reports of the committee. The difference in their reports was that
the minority saw objections to immediate action and urged further study.
Following are some excerpts from the debate which point up the concern
of the delegates with the principles involved:
. . . but I want to point this out, that economists, including those
friendly to labor, are agreed that a situation where one party sits on
both sides of a bargaining table is impossible ...
I don't think we should sit down on both sides of the bargaining
table. It can't be done. There is only one place where it is done. That
is in Soviet Russia, and I know that neither the majority nor the
minority want that kind of a system. You can't do it in a democracy.
PROCEEDINGS, p. 133 (Speech by Delegate Everett).
• . . It is my observation that when in war we allow our army to use
all the forces at its command. . . It is my feeling that we should
allow our International Executive Board to hold out all the means
available to be sure our side wins.
PROCEEDINGS, p. 134 (Speech by Delegate Ralston).
I don't think the Guild wants to go in the newspaper business,
but we are being forced to go in it for our own survival, for our
own salvation.
PROCEEDINGS,

p. 137 (Speech by Delegate Klein).

We are a union, and I think we ought to get ourselves settled in the
pretty important things, bargaining and negotiating and organizing,
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Union Ownership of Employer's Competitor, Customer, or
Supplier

Unions have established or promoted firms whose employees
the union neither represented nor sought to represent but which
dealt or competed with businesses with which the union bargained.
For example, a local affiliated with the Optical Workers Union,
AFL-CIO, established a new corporation to engage in the wholesale optical business in competition with firms with which the local had collective bargaining agreements. The local made unsecured loans from its funds to the new corporation and sold the
company's stock to members of the local. The local's purpose in
establishing the corporation was primarily to create jobs for its unemployed and secondarily to provide financial return to union
members who purchased the stock. While the local did not own a
controlling interest in the firm, the local did concede that it, in
effect, controlled the company's management. In Bausche &
Lomb Optical Co., 9 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
had to decide whether the local union had, under these facts,
demonstrated a lack of good faith in its bargaining with a competing
employer. The Board determined that the local's status as a competitor put it in a position where it might, although there was no
evidence that it did, seek wages, hours, or other working conditions from other employers which would promote the competitive
advantage of the new firm rather than the interests of the emand not dissipate our energies with something of this nature at this
time....
PROCEEDINGS, p. 145 (Speech by Delegate Gnerro).
I am not going to stand here or vote in this convention to bind my
union to an operation which up to now has been alien to the usual
function of a union.
PROCEEDINGS, p. 147 (Speech by Delegate Bucknam).
In looking through the collective bargaining report, I see that one of
our planks is that we shall seek unity with craft unions.
Now, on Project X [as the proposal was termed] we seek to become the employers of craft unions. I, for one, don't want to be placed
in a position of walking on a picket line in front of a privately-owned
newspaper, and on the other end of town find myself cross a picket
line because I am an employer of the people working there ....
PROCEEDINGS, p. 149 (Speech by Delegate Potoker).
As these excerpts from the debate indicate, many practical obstacles
occurred to the delegates in their consideration of the proposal. Subsequently, the majority report calling for immediate action was defeated
by substitution of the minority report which counseled further study. No
subsequent move by the American Newspaper Guild to enter the publishing
field has been successful, although the union has, in various strike situations, sponsored the publication of daily newspapers for the duration of
the strike which was preventing publication of the regular daily newspaper
in the community involved.
19. 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954).
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ployees. Because of this possibility the Board dismissed the local
union's complaint that the employer, a competitor of the new
company, refused to bargain in good faith.2 0
The formation of the American Coal Shipping Company-a
joint enterprise of the United Mine Workers (UMW) and the coal
mine operators-has also created a potential conflict of interest.
The firm was established to purchase ships and to carry on worldwide sales activities for the coal industry. This joint venture helped
preserve the union members' jobs, despite shrinking American
coal markets, by opening new foreign markets for American-mined coal.2 In this situation the union leaders wear two hats when
dealing with coal mine operators. On one day they are dealing
with management as partners in a business venture, and on the
next day they are adversaries bargaining with management for employee benefits. It is quite possible that friendships and attitudes
developed while consorting with management as a partner may
dampen the union leaders' ardor for promoting the employees'
cause at the bargaining table.
Another example of this potential problem exists in the sheep
industry. The Sheepshearers' Union formed a corporation to manufacture sheepshearing equipment. Corporate stock was sold to
union members and the union's executives managed the business.
The firms and individuals using this equipment are almost unanimous in their choice of manufacturer, and the firm has become
the largest of its type in the country.2 2 A similar potential conflict
of interests was presented by the Seafarers International Union's,
AFL-CIO, organization of a corporation to sell "slop chest" supplies to shipping companies with which the union had collective
bargaining agreements. Before the corporation-union sales activities were halted by an antitrust action, the firm had acquired a
sizeable business.23
The obvious conflict of interests question in these two union
enterprises is what economic advantages did the union-owned corporations enjoy by virtue of the unions' bargaining position with
the corporations' customers, and were these advantages acquired
at the expense of the workers the unions represented. The prices
charged the customer-employer for the goods may have reduced
the employer's ability to pay increased wages. Or, the customer20. Id. at 1558.
21. See Business Week, June 4, 1960, p. 87.
22. See The Butcher Workman, March-April, 1961, pp. 2-3. (This
Newspaper is the official organ of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters &

Butcher Workmen of North Amer., AFL-CIO.)

23. Streiffer v. Seafarers Sea Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602, 607 (E.D.
La. 1958).
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employer may have purchased inferior goods from the union-owned
corporation for the use of the employees. On the other hand, possibly no employee benefits were actually traded for the unionowned corporations' preferential treatment-but the opportunity
for such trading existed.

B.

UNION OWNERSHP OF A NONCONTROLLING INTEREST

Where a union purchases the stocks or securities of a corporation with which the union bargains without, at the same time, assuming an active managerial role in the firm, it is still possible
for a conflict of interest to arise because of the union's dual allegiance. As a security holder, the union has an interest in the
firm and is concerned with the return which will be derived from
the investment. Therefore, any given course of action may have
repercussions on both the employees represented by the union and
the union's investment.
Notwithstanding this potential conflict, several major unions
have felt compelled to aid the industries with which they bargain
in order to protect their members' jobs. In 1946, the International
Typographical Union (ITU) formed the Unitypo Corporation.
Unitypo has started newspapers in various cities in the United
States and Canada where members of the LT.U. have become engaged

in a strike or a lockout with a monopoly publisher. It has also rendered encouragement and financial assistance to publishers considered
friendly to labor and who were in competition with a newspaper considered unfair by the I.T.U. The activities of Unitypo in various places
in assisting newspapers who were competing with so-called unfair
newspapers were described in a report of one of its committees as the
"development of a new and practical economic defensive weapon for
economic pressure on unfair employers through permanent and effective competition."' 4

The Amalgamated Clothing Workers, AFL-CIO, and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, have established banks which specialize in loans to companies in the particular area of the clothing industry in which each claims jurisdiction.25 The industry primarily consists of small manufacturers who often have little capital and operate on narrow profit
margins. Through these loans the unions have managed to stabilize
certain areas of the clothing industry and to provide fairly constant
26
employment for union members.
24.
15, 19
25.
26.

Scott Publishing Co. v. Columbia Basin Publishers; Inc., 293 F.2d
(9th Cir. 1961).
See N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1959, § 6 (Magazine), pp. 9, 69.
For an exhaustive analysis of the role of the ILGWU in aiding and

stabilizing the garment industry, see Wolfson, Role of the ILGWU in

NOTES
Similarly, the UMW has become a financial force in the coal
industry. The UMW has pledged approximately $15,000,000 of
Treasury bonds as security for loans which the UMW-owned National Bank of Washington made to coal mine operators." Furthermore, the UMW owns stock in several coal companies; 2 s as a
stockholder it has encouraged and assisted management in an attempt to revitalize the coal industry through mechanization of the
coal mining process.29
The potential conflict which this form of investment creates is
demonstrated by the Teamsters' recent experience in purchasing
municipal bonds. In order to attract a rubber company to Deming, New Mexico, the city issued municipal bonds for the acquisition of funds to build a new plant. Subsequent to the Teamsters'
purchase of these bonds, the Teamsters intervened in the Rubber
Workers Union's organizing campaign at the new plant. The
Teamsters reportedly took forceful steps to become the employees'
bargaining agent for the purpose of insuring that the employees
would not be represented by a union which would insist upon
Stabilizing the Women's Garment Industry, 4

IND. & LAB. REL. REV.

33

(1950).
Mr. James Lipsig, Assistant Executive Secretary of the ILGWU, stated
in a recent letter discussing investments of this type:
Bear in mind that our general rule is "no such investments." In the
few exceptional cases which may arise, a loan might be granted only
in order to safeguard the jobs of our members ...
In the few loans which we have made, the amount has been in five
figures at most, and were scheduled to run for a period of only a few
years.
Letter From James Lipsig to the Minnesota Law Review, Aug. 2, 1961.
27. See Business Week, June 4, 1960, p. 87.
28. Ibid.
29. See Time, Jan. 20, 1961, p. 82.
While rapid mechanization seems to be the best hope for the coal
mining industry to regain its vitality, see REsER, TAE ECONOMiCS OF
THE COAL INDUSTRY 161 (1958), the statistics tend to support a contrary
view. In 1948, 125,000 miners in West Virginia produced 168 million tons
of coal; in 1958, after expending 500 million dollars on mechanization,
68,000 miners produced 150 million tons. By the end of 1960, an average
of 36,000 miners had produced about 120 million tons of coal. Francois,
Where Poverty Is Permanent, The Reporter, April 27, 1961, p. 38.
The situation is similar elsewhere in the coal fields. In Harlan County,
Kentucky, there are now (1961) fewer than 5,000 miners where there were
12,500 in 1950. In central Pennsylvania, 75,000 mine-workers were in the
mines 20 years ago; there are fewer than 15,000 now. The reason for such
employment dislocations has been the rapid mechanization of the industry, which in turn was caused by a desperate need to meet the competition of other fuels for the coal market. In 1900, coal supplied 70% of
the nation's energy requirements. Now it provides only 26.7%. Oil and
natural gas are the prime cause of the coal industry's weakness. Ibid.
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wages and fringe benefits which would jeopardize the Teamsters'
investment.30

Unquestionably, a similar potential conflict of interest is not
presented by the token investments of the United Auto Workers,
AFL-CIO (UAW), in various corporations. The UAW owns one
share of common stock in each company with which it has a collective bargaining agreement. Its reason for acquiring these stocks
was to obtain financial data from the companies with which it
bargained. The ownership of these single shares does not create
problems of conflicting interests for the UAW. However, the UAW
is considering more extensive investments in common stocks because of their higher yield as compared to other union investments.3 1 This possibility prompts the following inquiry: how
30. The United Rubber Workers, AFL-CIO, which had been the bargaining agent for the employees of the firm at its old location in Indiana,
attempted to organize the new plant in Deming, New Mexico. The Teamsters, who had purchased the bonds of the municipality which were issued
to build the physical plant, intervened in the representation proceedings
and sought bargaining rights. Two elections were held; the first was a tie,
the second resulted in a majority for the Teamsters. See Rivers, The Businesslike Mr. Hoffa, Reporter, Feb. 2, 1961, pp. 28, 29.
In its objections to conduct affecting the election, the Rubber Workers
union alleged, among other charges, that "the Teamsters were not a labor
organization within the meaning of the Labor-Management Relations Act
because of their financial interest in Auburn and should. have been excluded from the ballot in the election." See NLRB, REPORT ON OBJECTIONS AND CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVES, AUBURN RUBBER CO.
AND UNITED RUBBER WORKERS AND INT'L BD. OF TEAMSTERS, Case No.

33-RC-777, at 27 (Oct. 6, 1960). The Rubber Workers union also alleged
a number of pro-Teamster acts on the part of the employer.
The Regional Director, Mr. Edwin A. Elliott, refused to entertain the
objection to the Teamsters' status on the ground that it was a post-election objection that could not properly be raised. "Had the issue been raised
at a proper time the matter might have been litigated at a proper hearing."
Id. at 10. Having disposed of the matter on this ground, however, he proceeded to take notice of the fact that the Teamsters union "has for many
years been accepted and treated as a labor organization within . . . the
Act. No precedent has been established which would deny the Teamsters a
place on the ballot because of an alleged conflict of interests." Ibid. The
report then analyzed the financial involvement of the Teamsters-its purchase of municipal bonds issued by the village of Deming guaranteed in
part by a mortgage on the municipally-owned plant and equipment which
was being operated under contract by the Auburn firm. The report noted
that the purchase was by a separately-administered pension fund of the
Teamsters, and that the fund had no ownership or management rights in
Auburn, in the village of Deming, or in any of the agent groups that took
part in the sale and transfer of the firm from Indiana to New Mexico. Ibid.
Because the report was issued pursuant to a consent election, the findings of the Regional Director stand without further appeal to the full Board.
There is no way, therefore, for the Rubber Workers union to pursue their
allegation that a conflict of interest existed which prohibited the Teamsters
from properly representing the employees.
31. See Time, Jan. 20, 1961, p. 82.
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much stock or other securities of an employer-corporation can a
union prudently acquire without making itself prone to compromising the employees' legitimate needs for the sake of the union's
investment?
II.

UNION INVESTMENTS AND INTER-UNION
RELATIONSHIPS

The fact that any of these investments are made by the international union rather than by the local union is significant in determining whether a particular investment will create a conflict of
interests. Certainly, the more remote the source of investment is
from the union which deals with the company in which union funds
are invested, the more unlikely it is that a conflict of interests will
arise. However, because of the relationship which normally exists
between the international and the local, a conflict may arise even
if the international
does the investing and the local does the bar32
gaining.:
Arguably the international union, as a separate organization,
can invest its general treasury funds in a business with which one
of its local unions has a bargaining relationship without creating
an interest conflict for the local. Even though part of the international's investment might come from a fund in which the local has
a continuing interest-such as pension and insurance funds-the
local's proportionate share of the investment would be very small.
Therefore, the local union's interests would continue to be advanced by pressing for collective bargaining gains despite the
fact that any gains would increase the cost of labor and make the
investment in the employer's business by the international less
attractive.
In practice, however, the working relationship between the international and the local will often discourage any independent
action by the local which would not be in the parent international
union's best interests. By their constitutions, all international unions
retain the power to impose restrictions upon local union decisionmaking.33 In some unions these restrictions are so complete that
the local is a mere administrative unit completely dependent upon
the international union.3 4 For example, the international is often
vested with the authority to make constitutional changes, to estab32. For a general discussion of the framework of the local and inter-

national union, see BARBASH, UNIONS AND UNION LEADERSHIP at xiii-xx
(1959).
33. See generally BROMWICH, UNION CONSTITUTIONS (1959).
34. See Cohn, The International and the Local Union, N.Y.U. 11TH
CONF. ON LABOR 7 (1958).
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lish organizing policies, to negotiate industry-wide contracts, and to
authorize strike action on the local level.' International union
constitutions typically (1) prescribe the system local unions may
use for financial accounting, (2) require frequent audits, status
reports, and other paperwork, (3) call for the international's prior
approval of changes to the local's constitution and by-laws, and
(4) establish the dues and fees which the local may collect from
its members. 6 The most extreme measure that may be used by the
international is to place the local in trusteeship; this is a process by
which the international appoints a trustee to administer the local
and assume the powers of the locally elected officers." The threat
of trusteeship and the consequent loss of operating control is often
an effective block to any local action which might displease the
international union.
The international also has effective sanctions that are not as
severe as trusteeship. It may change the jurisdictional boundaries
of the local thereby altering the local's membership, or it may
bring disciplinary action against the officers of the local union. s
Although the local theoretically has the power to secede from the
international, this power has little practical value as a defensive
weapon against a domineering international. Secession rarely can
or will be accomplished because many local union charters provide
that as long as a minimum number of members remain in good
standing and wish to retain the charter, secession is forbidden.39
Furthermore, many charters granted by the international provide
that the international has reversionary rights in any property or
money retained by its local union affiliates. Therefore, the local
may lose its assets if it secedes.40 Finally, if the local union's mem35. See Brown v. Hook, 79 Cal. App. 2d 781, 786, 180 P.2d 982, 985
(Dist. Ct. App. 1947); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. J. A.
Jones Constr. Co., 240 S.W.2d 49, 54 (Ky. 1951); Spica v. ILGWU, 388
Pa. 382, 387-88, 130 A.2d 468, 470-71 (1957); Edgar v. Southern Ry.,
213 S.C. 445, 450-51, 49 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1948).
36. See Cohn, supranote 34, at 8-14.
37.
Trusteeships shall be established and administered by a labor organization over a subordinate body only in accordance with the constitution
and bylaws of the organization which has assumed trusteeship over the
subordinate body and for the purpose of correcting corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of collective bargaining
agreements or other duties of a bargaining representative, restoring
democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such labor organization.
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 302, 73 Stat. 531 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 462 (Supp. 1960).
38. See Cohn, supra note 34, at 8-10.
39. Ibid. See 87 C.J.S. Trade Unions § 44 (1954).
40. See Greenberg, Disposition of Union Assets Upon Disaffiliation,

33 TEMP. L.Q. 152, 154 (1960); Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1209-26 (1952).
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bers have a substantial interest in welfare and pension funds which
are held by the local or by the international, serious questions will
arise as to the disposition of these funds upon disaffiliation.41 The
threat of depriving the local's members of these benefits is a substantial weapon in the hands of an international union challenged
by a dissident local union.
Courts have taken judicial notice of this almost complete domination of many locals by their internationals, and they have considered the local and the international as one quasi-corporation
for service of process on the international. 2 These decisions lend
weight to the argument that the influence of the international upon
the actions of its locals is often considerable.
Therefore, where the international exerts considerable influence
on the local, it is not really free to act independently or to bargain
for advantages that may oppose the parent international's interests. The local serves two masters-its members and its parent
body. If the local bargains with a firm dominated by its parent
body, the local must, of necessity, have conflicting loyalties where
the interests of its members are contrary to the interests of the
"employer"-the international union.
While the close relationship between the international and the
local may result in a conflict of interests, this relationship also
provides the international with an effective means of discouraging
the local from making investments that will conflict with its duty
to its members. Furthermore, the AFL-CIO's power over the international unions43 should provide the leverage by which the internationals can be persuaded to exercise leadership in eliminating
conflict problems on both the local and international level.
The AFL-CIO, however, is merely a loose federation of international unions which have divergent philosophies and which are
sensitive to external interference. Except for the local's connection
with its international, the AFL-CIO has no direct dealings with
the local.4 4 Any pressure which the AFL-CIO might exert on the
locals in the investment area will have to be through the internationals. Despite these limitations and the existence of large inde41. Greenberg, supra note 40, at 156.
42. See Juneau Spruce Corp. v. International Longshoremen's Union,
37 Cal. 2d 760, 235 P.2d 607 (1951); Oil Workers Int'l Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 230 P.2d 71 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951);
International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. 1. A. Jones Constr. Co., 240
S.W.2d 47, 54 (Ky. 1951); Spica v. ILGWU, 338 Pa. 382, 130 A.2d

468 (1957).
43. See Cox, LABOR

LAw 14-18 (4th ed. 1958); Gilbert, The International Union-A New Legal Entity, 7 LAB. L.J. 335 (1956).
44. See AFL-CIO CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 4; see generally GOLDBERG, op.

cit. supra note 4, at 109-12.
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pendent unions which are not members of the AFL-CIO-notably
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the United Mine
Workers-the AFL-CIO has been and continues to be the prime
source of direction in the union movement.
Unfortunately, the AFL-CIO's position on permissible union
investments is not clearly defined. Its investment goals are unsettled and, although a policy has been announced, the policy has
never been clearly articulated. The apparent indecision of the
AFL-CIO in this area can be better understood by first examining
the evolution of union investment policies.
III.

AFL-CIO INVESTMENT POLICY

The classic position of the American labor movement has been
to maintain a clear-cut delineation between labor and management. There were to be no entanglements between the two protagonists. Labor believed, and management insisted, that management should manage and that labor's role was to seek the best
possible bargain. The union was not a partner with management,
but rather a constructive critic. 5 This conception of the union's
role prompted development of the union position that direct investments in business were incompatible with the union's bargaining function.16 Economic conditions in the union movement's
embryonic period prompted ready acceptance of this approach.
Union treasuries were small. At a time when operating expenses
were difficult for most unions to meet, both union leaders and
members cultivated a protective and jealous attitude toward their
treasuries. They recognized that the realm of finance was a complex area into which they could venture only at the risk of serious financial loss. Therefore, they favored conservative, secure
investments with little risk potential. The small sums which were
available for investment were either placed on deposit in a savings
institution or used to purchase government securities.47
45.
Classical unionism . . . agreed that management has the right to
manage, that owners have the right to profit, and that management
and owners shoulder exclusive responsibility for the firm ...
[C]Iassical unionism never claimed co-managerial functions or showed willingness to share managerial responsibilities. Strictly limiting its
function to the making of demands, it left the employer to decide
how these could be fitted into the cost structure and market conditions of his enterprise.
AMERICAN

ENTERPRISE

ASS'N,

UNIONISM

REAPPRAISED

25 (1960).

46. "Neither the AFL-CIO nor any national or international union affiliated with the AFL-CIO shall invest in or make loans to any business enterprise with which it bargains collectively." Canon 5, AFL-CIO CODE OF
ETHICAL PRACTICES

39 (1958).

47. See U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 29, 1960, p. 89.
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With union growth, recognition, and success at the bargaining
table, the picture has changed. Mounting union funds, in large
part a result of union success in negotiating liberal fringe benefits during the past two decades, have made union financial planning a complicated business." During the same period, the demands of industry-wide bargaining and increased government
regulation of union affairs have developed a new type of union
leader. Present day labor leaders manage large organizations which
have an infinite variety of administrative and financial problems
which are comparable to those of a large business concern. It is,
indeed, a present-day platitude that union leaders resemble their
counterparts in management more than their colleagues in the factory. They are often sophisticated businessmen with a sophisticated
investment outlook and their coups in the investment market have
been widely reported.
The change is not, however, as great as appearances might indicate. Tradition dies slowly, and the traditional view of the union's
proper investment role has been partly preserved in the Codes of
Ethical Practices adopted by the AFL-CIO in 1957. These six
Codes purport to set forth the principles governing the conduct of
union affairs, and they are binding upon all unions which are members of the AFL-CIO.4" The cardinal principle governing union
investments is simply stated:
[A] union, unlike a bank, a trustee, or other fiduciaries is not primarily
a manager of funds vested with the duty of enhancing their value and
making distributions. Increasing the value of the union's funds should
never become an objective of such magnitude that it in any way in-

terferes with or obscures the basic function of the union, which is
to devote 50its full resources to representing its members, honestly and
faithfully.

From this principle the Codes derived "additional conclusions":
(1) investment of all union reserves in government bonds is to
48. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1959, § 6 (Magazine), p. 9; Lester, The

Changing Nature of the Union, N.Y.U. 13TH CONF. ON LAB. 19, 23-24

(1960).
49. The AFL-CIO Code of Ethical Practices was approved in sections
by the AFL-CIO Executive Council and was affirmed by vote of the Sec-

ond Constitutional Convention at Atlantic City, New Jersey, in December,
1957. The six ethical practices codes deal with paper locals (locals without
members or with fictitious members); health and welfare funds; racketeers,
crooks, Communists, and Fascists in the labor movement; investments and
business interest of union officials; financial practices and proprietary activities of unions; minimum accounting and financial control; and union
democratic practices. All unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO were required
to adopt the Code by April 15, 1958.
50. AFL-CIO, CODE OF ETHICAL PRACTICES 35 (1958).
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be commended because this helps "to protect and strengthen our
democratic institutions"; (2) loans and grants "to promote the organization of the unorganized" are to be encouraged notwithstanding the fact that the return on investment is small and the
loan or grant is not secure; (3) sound business considerations
should not control union investment decisions.5
This theoretical AFL-CIO position was implemented, in part,
by the AFL-CIO Executive Council in August, 1960, when the
council established a special department to advise national and
local unions on the investment of union funds in home mortgages. AFL-CIO President George Meany stated that the new department's objectives were threefold: first, to put sufficient money
into the home mortgage field so that the interest rates would be
reduced; second, to stimulate construction and therefore provide
more jobs in the building trades; and third, to increase the return
on union investments. 52
However, a few months later, the executive council announced
a more ambitious plan which appears to signal a retreat from the
Codes. The council established a full-time department of investment, directed by a professional investment counselor, to provide
assistance to AFL-CIO affiliates in all fields of investment. The
stated purpose for the department's establishment was to achieve
an increased return on union investment capital. 3 Thus, it appears
that more emphasis has been placed on investment yield which
heretofore was considered a secondary factor in union investment
decisions. Conceivably, with concerted action by the affiliated
unions, the AFL-CIO could become an investment force of some
magnitude.54 There is, however, no indication that the AFL-CIO
intends to use investments as a coercive weapon in its struggle
with management, or that it will materially alter its basic investment philosophy as stated in the Codes. However, the AFL-CIO
51. Id. at 36-37.

52. See U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 29, 1960, p. 89; Business
Week, Aug. 20, 1960, p. 110.
53. See Time, Jan. 20, 1961, p. 82.
54. An extreme example of a big union that virtually controls the business of an entire national economy through its investment activities is
the Histadrat in Israel. This labor union federation of 200,000 members,
one-third of the population of Israel, operates huge industries, finances
giant corporations, and develops communal agricultural colonies. "Look
behind practically any large industry in Israel today and you will find the
ubiquitous Histadrat financial arm. The Histadrat boasts that approximately 30 per cent of the gainfully employed population of the country
."Minneapolis Tribare employed under Histadrat-owned Heast Ovdim ...
une, March 13, 1961, p. 13, col. 1.
The history, policies, and activities of the Histadrat are described in 15
ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 424b (1960).
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has indicated that it is not presently in complete agreement with
its own Codes. Furthermore, it is arguable that the Codes are impractical in light of the modem union's size, obligations, and financial needs.
The previously discussed examples of union investment indicate
that some member unions are completely ignoring the directions
of the Codes. The Codes provide that "neither the AFL-CIO nor
any national or international union affiliated with the AFL-CIO
should invest in or make loans to any business enterprise with
which it bargains collectively."' 5, Apparently, there has been no attempt by the AFL-CIO to enforce this provision of the Codes.
The formal AFL-CIO position, expressed in the Codes, seems
more restrictive than the AFL-CIO union leaders and the affiliated
internationals are prepared to accept. However, unless the union
leaders establish a reasonable standard and enforce it, the possibility of abuse may prompt action from less sympathetic forces
outside the union movement. 6
IV.

EXISTING FEDERAL CONTROLS-HOW
EFFECTIVE ARE THEY

A.

PROHIBITIONS ON EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE

1.

Unfair LaborPractices

There is no indication that the conflict of interest problems
created by union investments were even considered by the drafters of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). However, the
drafters did find the notion of mixed management and labor responsibility repugnant.5 7 They observed that "collective bargaining is reduced to a sham when the employer sits on both sides of
the table . . ... , Consequently, the NLRA provided, as did
subsequent amendments contained in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 9 that it is an unfair labor practice for the employer to interfere with or dominate the formation
or administration of his employees' collective bargaining association. This prohibition applies even though the intention and the
consequences of interference or domination are beneficial to the
55. AFL-CIO CODE Op ETHICAL PRAcTIcEs 39 (1958).
56. See Summers, The Role of Legislation in Internal Union Affairs, 10
LAB. L.J. 155, 159 (1959).
57. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1935); H.R. REP.

No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19 (1935).
58. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1935).
59. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958).
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workers.6" The thrust of the NLRA, as interpreted by the Board,
is to promote the national labor policy of allowing free collective bargaining to resolve labor-management differences."' The
Board, in administering the Act, has recognized that the purpose
of the Act was to draw a clear line between management and employees and to eliminate the possibility of conflicting allegiances."2
However, the Board has never had to decide a case in which the
issue of conflict of interest due to union investments was squarely
presented.
The ban on employer interference with internal union operations is provided for in section 8(2) (now section 8(a) (2)) of
the NLRA.63 The legislative history makes it clear that the objective of this section was to prevent the formation of companydominated unions.64 When a union acts in a commercial capacity
as an employer rather than in its capacity as a collective bargaining representative, it is treated as an employer.65 Hence, there
60. NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241,
251 (1939). See Ed Tausig, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 470, 476 (1954).
61. See 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 155-59 (1951).
62. 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 108-26 (1938).
63.
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support
to it ....
49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
The purpose of Section 8(2) [now 8(a) (2)] is apparent. The formation and administration of labor organizations are the concern of
the employees and not of the employer. The Board has held that any
conduct of an employer which has the effect of defeating the freedom of employees to carry on this function constitutes an unfair labor practice ....
3 NLRB ANN. REP. 125-26 (1938).
See the discussion of the court in NLRB v. Thompson Products, Inc.,
130 F.2d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d
713, 722 (3d Cir. 1939).
64. See reports cited note 57 supra. See also Wayside Press, Inc. v.
NLRB, 206 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1953); Crager, Company Unions Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 40 MIcH. L. REV. 831 (1942); Note,
Union Domination by Employer-New Approach, 8 W. REs. L. REv. 529
(1957).
Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 (1958), was adopted with identical objectives in view. See S. REP.
No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1935). In addition, the following
states have statutory provisions outlawing company domination of unions:
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York,
Pennsylvania, Utah and Wisconsin.
65. When the NLRA was reported out of committee by the Senate the
Senate Report stated:
In one sense every labor organization is an employer, it hires clerks,
secretaries and the like. In its relations with its own employees, a la-
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seems to be no reason why the Board and the courts could not
view union domination of the management of a business with
which the union bargained as employer domination of the union.
But while such an interpretation of section 8 (a) (2) would not be
difficult for the Board to justify, it offers little relief to employees
victimized by the conflict of interest. In practice, employees would
be reluctant to file a complaint because in most cases the union
initially assumes managerial functions to preserve jobs in a failing
business. Without union support such a company would probably
fail. The worker, therefore, is not likely to insist upon his rightsregardless of how he is treated. Yet without a complaint the Board
will not consider an unfair labor practice charge or intervene
where a collective bargaining representative has been certified. 66
2.

Employee RepresentationProceedings

Even though the precise question has not been ruled on, the
Board appears to have broad discretion to grant or withhold initial certification of a union with managerial interests. The Board
is empowered to place appropriate limitations on the choice of a
bargaining representative when it finds that public or statutory
policies so dictate. 67 For many years the Board exercised this
discretion, and it refused to place any union that it considered incapable of acting as a bona fide bargaining representative on a
representation election ballot. Thus, the Board has refused to allow
certification elections where (1) management conceived and organized the labor organization,68 (2) supervisory personnel were
responsible for forming the labor organization, 69 (3) supervisory
personnel took part in the labor organization,7" (4) management
bor organization ought to be treated as an employer, and the bill so
provides.

2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at
1102 (1949).
The NLRB, however, is not compelled to assert jurisdiction over labor

disputes involving a union and its employees if the purposes of the act are

not effectuated by an assertion of jurisdiction. Office Employees Int'l
Union v. NLRB, 235 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956).

66. NLRA § 10(b), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1958).

As an alternative, the union could possibly be charged with a failure to
bargain in good faith in violation of § 8(b) (3). But, again, the same problems of reluctance to bring a charge would be present. In addition, there

is nothing in the legislative history of § 8(b)(3) to suggest that it is de-

signed to protect the union-members from the consequences of bad faith
bargaining on the part of the union.
67. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422 (1947).
68. Douglas Aircraft Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 486 (1943).
69. Alaska Salmon Indus., Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 185 (1948).
70. American Dist. Tel. Co. of Pa., 89 N.L.R.B. 1635 (1950).
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could unilaterally terminate the so-called collective bargaining
agreement,"' or (5) the employer dominated the labor organization."2 However, in two later cases the Board chose to narrow the
scope of the inquiry it will conduct at the time of a representation
hearing.7 3 In each case the Board refused to consider evidence of
employer domination of the union on the ground that such domination would, if true, constitute an unfair labor practice, and in
the absence of a charge of an unfair labor practice the Board
would refuse to litigate the subject at the time of the representation hearing. Member Murdock dissented vigorously in both cases;
he urged that the Board should enlarge the scope of its inquiry at
the time of the petition for an election and consider all matters
pertaining to unfair labor practices. 74
The Board has further limited itself by ruling that it will not
process any petition for a representation election if there is an outstanding charge of unfair labor practice against the petitioning
union.75 This requirement is not applied without exception-some
charges may be waived by the moving party in order to reach a
speedy election.7 6 However, the possibility of raising the issue of
employer-union interrelation may not be open to any interested
party to the petition if a speedy election is desired. For example,
an intervenor who seeks to obtain bargaining rights for the employees as against another union-which the intervenor claims is
really "management"---cannot raise the question, under the Board's
present policies, in such a fashion that it will be considered by the
Board prior to the election. The intervenor has two choices: it may
file an unfair labor practice charge, litigate the issue and wait for
a subsequent election which may not be timely; or it may attempt
to raise the issue at the representation hearing in which case the
Board will probably refuse to hear the matter in the absence of
an unfair labor practice charge. Furthermore, in the absence of a
formal charge, the Board is likely to refuse to consider the facts if
the intervenor files an objection to the results of the election.7"
From the standpoint of possible conflicts of interest, member
Murdock's position seems to be the better view. The Board is free
to inquire into any aspect of the petitioning union's qualifications,
71. Phelps Dodge Corp., United Verde Branch, 6 N.L.R.B. 624 (1938).
72. New York Merchandise Co., 50 N.L.R.B. 41 (1943).
73. Nathan Warren & Sons, 119 N.L.R.B. 292 (1957); Bi-States Co.,
117 N.L.R.B. 86 (1957).
74. Ibid. See also Columbia Pictures Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 466 n.7 (1951).
75. Dan River Mills, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 645 (1958).
76. O.K. Van & Storage Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 795 (1958). See also Cox,
LABoR LAw 341-42 (4th ed. 1958).
77. See 24 NLRB ANN. RPx. 76 (1959).
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despite its exercise of discretion not to so inquire. The Board's determinations after such an inquiry, if reasonable, are binding upon
a reviewing court." Since it would be contrary to national labor
policy to permit a union with a self-serving interest in the management of a business to serve as the bargaining representative of
the employees of that business,79 the Board should use its full
scope of inquiry to make an initial determination whether a union
is a proper representative under the definitions of the NLRA. At
the certification stage the Board may unquestionably exercise independent initiative; whereas, at a later date it must, if it follows
past practices, wait for a complaint to be filed by an aggrieved
employee. Therefore, if the Board refuses to exercise authority
initially, it may very likely be frustrated at a later date when the
conflict is more apparent and no complaint is forthcoming from
affected employees.
B.

UNIONS AS TiE EMPLOYER'S AGENT

If a union merely purchases stocks and securities of an employer-company without assuming an active managerial role, it still
may have a dual allegiance which creates conflicts of interest. As
a security holder, the union has an equitable share in the firm
and a direct interest in the return which it receives on the investment even though it has no direct voice in making the original
management decisions. Thus, in this situation the union must always face the question of the effect which union action will have
on the business-for example, to what extent would a strike
adversely affect the business?
In this situation it would be difficult to classify an employeroriented union as an "employer" because the NLRA defines an
employer as "any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly . . ."I" The Board would have to apply
common-law rules of agency to ascertain whether the union was in
fact acting for the employer."' However, if the Board were to
determine that the union is the employer's agent and that the union
discouraged a strike in order to protect its financial interest in the
78. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422 (1947);
May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 380 (1945).
79. "We are dealing here . . . with a clear legislative policy to free
the collective bargaining process from all taint of an employer's compulsion, domination, or influence." International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 72, 80 (1940).

80. 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1958).
81. The change in language introduced in Taft-Hartley was intended
to establish that both employers and labor organizations will be responsible
for the acts of their agents in accordance with the ordinary common-law
rules of agency. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1947).
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employer-company, the Board would be able to proceed in the
manner suggested in the preceding section-that is, the Board
could find that the union's actions constitute an unfair labor practice by the "employer" because he interfered with the employees'
right to free collective bargaining.
The difficulty is that the Board may be unable to find the requisite principal-agent relationship under the statutory test. The Act's
definition of an employer was altered by the Taft-Hartley amendments for the specific purpose of relieving management from responsibility for acts of officious intermeddlers s2 Prior to these
amendments the Act defined an employer as, inter alia, anyone
"acting in the interest of the employer,""3 and the Board construed the phrase to include nonagents of the employer who acted
in the latter's interest without his approval."4 However, the present
Act requires a much narrower reading. It is unlikely that a union
which had made loans to or bought the securities of a firm would
be held to be an agent of the employer simply because the union
acted in a manner to benefit the employer. The Board has held
that where the employer does not ratify the acts of the third party
and the acts were not under the direction of one in a managerial
position, the acts will not be attributed to the employer. 5 Thus, in
order to avoid responsibility for the actions of persons with a financial but non-managerial interest in the employer-company, the
employer needs only to disavow these actions."s
82. H.R. 3020 as passed in the Senate had included as an "employer"
any person "acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly . . . ." This was the same definition used in the original Wagner Act.

This language was changed because "under this language the Board frequently 'imputed' to employers anything that anyone connected with an
employer, no matter how remotely, said or did, notwithstanding that the
employer had not authorized what was said or done, and in many cases
had prohibited it." Instead, the new definitions provided for the application
of the "ordinary rules of the law of agency." 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
1947, at 302 (1948).
83. NLRA, ch. 372, § 2, 49 Stat. 450 (1935).
84. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
85. Before enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947, the Board
could extend the restrictions of § 8(2) to a city chamber of commerce
which coerced workers in the interest of an important employer in the city.
American Pearl Button Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 1113 (1943). The anti-union
statements of the wife of the employer's foreman could be curbed. TaylorColquitt Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 225 (1943). Under Taft-Hartley, however, a
bondholder of the employer's company who helped propose and solicit
signatures for anti-union letters has been considered outside the restrictions of § 8(a) (2). Goodyear Footwear Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 800 (1948). See
also Empire Pencil Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1949).
86.
The story that third persons give is that they are "volunteers," and
they stick to that story. Indeed Senators Taft and Nixon maintained
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT,
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EFFECT OF RECENT LABOR LEGISLATION

In 1959 the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA)1 7 placed a ceiling on the amount which a union
could loan to any union officer or employee,"5 but it made no attempt to restrict the nature or amount of loans or other investments which a union could make to other individuals or businesses."9 However, the nature and extent of a union's investments
must be reported annually to the Secretary of Labor, and such reports are public records." Senator Barry Goldwater, the Senate
Labor Committee's ranking Republican member at the time of the
LMRDA adoption, supported the view that the purpose and intent
of these provisions "is that if you get a sufficient spotlight in
terms of public information about these transactions, their undesirable effects can be minimized."'"
But just how effective is the "spotlight" of public knowledge?
Can we reasonably expect that the mere disclosure of investments
will curb improper union investments? Probably not-in fact Congress itself seems to be skeptical of the efficacy of public disclosure. Where Congress earnestly intended to eliminate improper
investments by union officials, it not only required disclosure, but
also enumerated specific types of improper investments.92 The
weakness of disclosure as a deterrent is illustrated by the union
members' failure to request financial reports from the Secretary of
that story in their minority report filed with the Report of the SubCommittee on Labor and Labor Managements Relations in the Southern Textile Industry.

"It seems to us that the subcommittee staff utterly fails to recognize
the fact that there are workers who prefer not to join the CIO. Because these workers sometimes by themselves and at other times joined by the minister, the doctor, the drug-store owner, and the proprietor of the local 5 & 10 store, have taken steps to defeat the organizational efforts of the CIO, the staff report assumes without argument
that their efforts must have been directed by the employer."
Wyle, Union Organization Activity Under Taft-Hartley, N.Y.U. 1 1TH
CONF. ON LAB. 191, 214-15 (1958).

87. LMRDA, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1960).
88. See LMRDA §§ 501, 503, 73 Stat. 535, 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
8§ 501, 503 (1960).
89. See LMRDA § 201(b), 73 Stat. 524 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 431(b)
(1960).
Although § 302(a) of the amended LMRA prohibits payments by an

employer to a union which is the bargaining representative of its employees, this prohibition is aimed at bribery, shakedowns, etc. and not at
interest payments. 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOsuRE ACT OF 1959 at 936-37 (1959).
90. LMRDA § 201, 73 Stat. 524 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 431 (1960).
91. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1825 (1959).
92. See note 88 supra.
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Labor.9" Furthermore, the manner in which investments must be
reported is so vague that little information can be obtained by
those who do inspect these reports.94 Thus, the LMRDA reporting procedure's value in this area appears to be only that it demonstrates the Act's inability to handle the problem.
D.

RESTRICTIONS ON BAD FAITH BARGAINING AND RESTRAINTS
OF TRADE

Existing legislation has been more successfully applied in protecting employers from the repercussions of union investments than
it has been in protecting the' unions' members. In Bausche &
Lomb Optical Co.,9 5 the local union controlled a company which
competed with firms with which the union bargained. The Board
held that the union, in this situation, was guilty of bad faith bargaining because it had placed itself in a position which provided
an opportunity for a conflict of interest to arise.9 6 The Board,
therefore, permitted the employer to refuse to bargain with the

union which controlled a competing firm. Such a competitive factor, the Board reasoned,
renders almost impossible the operation of the collective-bargaining
process. For, the union has acquired a special interest which may well
93. For example, the Minneapolis area office of the Bureau of Labor
Management Reports, stated in September, 1961, that it had processed
"only a handful" of requests for financial statements filed by unions in the
reporting area over which the office has jurisdiction. There are more than
1800 locals under the jurisdiction of the Minneapolis office.
94. For example, in the report for the period ended December 31, 1960,
the UMW international union listed the following loans and notes receivable:
Type

Amount at Beginning
of Reporting Period

Employees ...................... $
2,000
Other Individuals .......... 20,821,402
Business Enterprises ...... 13,549,969
Other Organizations ...... 22,171,967
Total

...................... $56,545,338

Amount at End of
Reporting Period
none
$20,808,047
13,662,469
24,406,967
$58,877,483

These entries in Schedule 2 of the Bureau of Labor Management Reports
(BLMR) form LM-2 scarcely satisfy the desire of any inquirer for
specific information. Yet except for such items as marketable securities and
real estate, for which the reporting forms demand itemization, the UMW
has used a lump sum wherever possible. The fact that the report, therefore,
is available from the BLMR office to any interested citizen is somewhat less
helpful than would at first appear to be the case. (Figures from photostatic
copy of United Mine Workers report furnished by the BLMR.)
95. 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954).
96. Id. at 1562.
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NOTES

be at odds with what should be its
sole concern-that of representing
97
the interests of the ... employees.

This special interest would seem to exist whether the local or the
international is the body which controls or holds a substantial interest in ihe competing firm. The Board, however, has not had an
opportunity to extend the Bausche & Lomb doctrine beyond the
facts of that case-a local union controlling a competing firm.
However, if the Board ever considers the problem of international
ownership, there seems to be no sound reason why the doctrine
would not be extended. The link between local and international
is usually substantial, and the involvement of a union in the employer-company through a less-than-controlling investment seems
to be potentially as full of conflict as is direct ownership.
Existing law also protects the employer when a union attempts
to coerce the employer, as part of a collective bargaining agreement, into dealing with a union-owned company for its supplies or
other needs. Again, the employer may, in this case, make a charge
before the Board that the union has not bargained in good faith,
and, in addition, the union is vulnerable to the sanctions imposed
by the antitrust laws. 9s In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers,99 the Supreme Court ruled that it is a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act for labor unions and their
members, in furtherance of their own interests, to combine with
employers and manufacturers of any goods to restrain competition and to monopolize marketing of these goods in interstate commerce."' 0 After Allen Bradley, the courts extended the reach of
the antitrust laws beyond union-business combinations which result
in the domination or control of the marketing of goods and services to instances of union-business combination which result in restraints upon business competition.' Once the union enters into
a business, that business is treated as any other business. A conspiracy between the union and that business is viewed as any other
union-business conspiracy." 2 Thus, attempts by a union to coerce
97. Id. at 1559.
98. Streiffer v. Seafarers Sea Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La.
1958).

99. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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Id. at 810.
United States v. Hamilton Glass Co., 155 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill.
see Comment, Sherman Act Applicable to Union-Nonunion CombiRestraining Commercial Competition, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 653

102.

Here, the Union has gone into business, and the use of the Union name

or Union funds, or the fact that the profits may inure to Union members does not make this a labor activity. .

.

. [I]t is, in that capacity,
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employers to purchase goods or services from a union-owned company have been found to constitute a violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act." °3
With the requirements of the LMRDA that all investments be
openly disclosed, such alleged combinations should be more readily detected where the competitors of the union-controlled firm
are reluctant to bring charges. The federal government has the
power to initiate antitrust actions without a complaint from an injured party; therefore, it is in a position to attack such combinations on its own initiative.' ° Again, however, there seems to be
little possibility that such action will reach the union which has a
financial interest in the welfare of a particular company, but which
has not engaged in actual collusion with that company. The antitrust laws, therefore, seem to provide protection only to competing
employers; they provide no remedy to the employees who are
represented by a union which bargains in bad faith because of
conflicting interests.
CONCLUSION
At this time it would be difficult to demonstrate that a significant number of employees have had their rights compromised by
their unions' investments. However, it seems imprudent to conclude that the status quo can be maintained in the face of expanding union investment opportunities without the union movement
and Congress giving careful attention to union investment practices. Existing legislation is neither designed nor suited to cope with
the problem of union investment in an employer's business, and,
although most unions have demonstrated a responsible attitude in
this area, the AFL-CIO has not established a clear and practical
standard for the unions to follow. Misguided, but well intentioned,
union officials could readily precipitate a situation which would
prompt legislative sanctions that severely limit even necessary union
investments in the employer's business. Therefore, it would seem
incumbent upon the AFL-CIO to take the lead in the examination and resolution of the problems of union investment. In addition, concurrent action by Congress is necessary because of the
AFL-CIO's limited control of its own affiliates and its lack of any
control over non-affiliated unions such as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the United Mine Workers.
subject to the antitrust provisions applicable to other commercial
entrepreneurs.
Streiffer v. Seafarers Sea Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602, 607 (E.D. La.
1958).
103. Ibid.
104. 12 Stat. 909 (1948); 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).

